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Abstract 
Understanding the oil market requires to study the behavior of both producers and consumers. 
The oil demand and also the OPEC supply have been more focused on, compare to the non-
OPEC supply. However, the mechanisms of oil market cannot be analyzed without studying the 
behavior of non-OPEC and the way they respond to price changes in short term and long term. 
Thus, in this research the price elasticity of non-OPEC supply is estimated. A comparison 
between the results of time series analysis and panel data analysis is provided to find out which 
model can explain the non-OPEC price responsiveness better than the others.  And also the 
difference between short term and long term price elasticity of non-OPEC supply is studied. 
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Sammendrag 
Å forstå oljemarkedet krever at man studerer oppførselen til både produsenter og forbrukere. Det 
har generelt vært mer fokus på etterspørselen etter olje og tilbudet fra OPEC enn det har vært på 
tilbudet fra land utenfor OPEC. Men mekanismene i oljemarkedet kan ikke analyseres uten å 
studere oppførselen til ikke-OPEC land, og hvordan de reagerer på prisendringer både på kort og 
lang sikt. Av den grunn er priselastisiteten på tilbud av olje fra land utenfor OPEC estimert i 
denne studien. En sammenligning mellom resultatene av tidsserieanalyse og paneldataanalyse er 
gitt for å finne ut hvilken modell som kan forklare prisresponsen i ikke-OPEC land på en best 
mulig måte. I tillegg er forskjellen mellom kortsiktige og langsiktige priselastisiteter utenfor 
OPEC også studert. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In order to understand the oil market, the behavior of both producers and consumers need to be 
studied. Clarifying how supply and demand respond to price changes helps to have a better 
insight of the oil market mechanisms. But among different energy markets, when the main focus 
is on oil, two groups of economic studies can be found more than the others: the studies about 
the demand and the studies about OPEC supply. To find out how the producers and consumers 
respond if they introduce new economic policies, the policy makers need to understand both 
demand and supply behavior. Also, the demand behavior is one of the determinant factors for 
producers to plan their supply, so both income elasticity and price elasticity have been estimated 
in several researches. But knowing more about the demand side cannot give enough 
understanding of the market and to plan how much oil the producers should produce to maximize 
their profits. Thus, the producers’ behavior and especially OPEC1 behavior is also needed to be 
studied and analyzed. But OPEC has been highly concentrated on and one of the reasons might 
be that the higher its market share the more the members can apply the market power and affect 
the prices. Therefore, it would be of interest of both demand and non-OPEC supply side to 
understand OPEC decisions and actions better. 
When it comes to non-OPEC behavior however, much fewer studies and empirical research have 
been done (Fæhn et al., 2013). Non-OPEC producers are price takers (Golombek et al., 2013) 
which means their production function mainly takes oil price into account, whereas OPEC may 
take the whole market including other factors into account. But since 1960 that OPEC was 
formed until 2012, in most of the years non-OPEC production have been much higher than 
OPEC. Also, between non-OPEC countries, there might be different groups with different 
production responses to changes in oil price. Thus, understanding the non-OPEC price 
responsiveness would definitely help to make the market mechanisms clearer. How much 
producers respond to price changes can be expressed by the price elasticity of supply. 
Therefore, this research will investigate whether the price elasticity of all non-OPEC supply are 
significantly higher than zero. And if yes how price elastic is the non-OPEC supply? The 
                                                 
1
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6 
 
research will also try to compare the short term price elasticity with the long term elasticity and 
find out whether long term elasticity are much larger than short term elasticity. 
To answer these questions, the research begins with looking at the general features of the oil 
market, including the fluctuations in oil production and reserves, and changes in oil price. Also, 
the important historical events and relevant literature are reviewed (chapter 2). After clarifying 
the market characteristics, the next step is to study the producer theory as the main basis of the 
empirical model, and also reviewing some other relevant theories (chapter 3). Defining the 
assumptions, variables, the selected functional form, and also data sources, are studied as the 
methodology of this research. The estimation methods are the last part of methodology and by 
reviewing those methods, three groups of models can be designed to estimate the price elasticity 
of supply: time series analysis using annual aggregate data, time series analysis using quarterly 
aggregate data, and panel data analysis using disaggregated data (chapter 4). And finally, these 
models give several estimation results, which are described and discussed as the last step to 
complete the research (chapter 5 and chapter 6). 
2. Background and literature review 
 
A change in oil price can represent the effect of various shocks, from economic changes to 
political power shifts and the decisions that are results of these shifts. Oil producers and oil 
consumers observe these changes and take them into account before and during their decision 
making process. This research aims to explore how non-OPEC producers respond to such 
shocks, which requires studying the market characteristics, including the structure and 
mechanisms of oil market. Oil supply and oil demand behavior affect each other and they cannot 
be considered separate from each other. So in addition to the changes in supply during the last 
decades, reviewing the demand behavior would also be useful for the research. In this chapter, 
the main features of oil market including, the main producers, and major uses are discussed. The 
relevant studies and literature are also reviewed. 
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General features of the oil market 
 
The structure of oil market is highly related to oil characteristics and also the challenges that the 
producers have to deal with when supplying oil. Like all other fossil fuels, oil falls into the non-
renewable resources category, which requires the producers to have an inter-temporal approach 
(as Hotelling (1931) suggests) for maximizing their profits (Fæhn et al., 2013). To achieve this 
goal, oil producers take the risk of exploration and try to increase their reserves (Mohn, 2008), 
because having more accessible oil reserves gives the producer the upper hand to compete with 
other ones in the market (Golombek et al., 2013). On the demand side of the market, non-
renewability of oil also increases the necessity of finding renewable substitutes to satisfy the 
consumption in long-run (Krautkraemer, 1998). But back to the supply side, the approach that oil 
producers use to maximize their profits depends on the market structure and mechanisms. 
While the market forces set the price and dictate it to non-OPEC producers, OPEC tries to 
control the price by changing their production (Dées et al., 2007). Non-OPEC producers try to 
maximize their profit with a competitive behavior, but OPEC follows a different behavior 
(Hansen and Lindholt, 2008). In short run, the market power that OPEC can apply to control the 
oil price varies from the effect they might have in long run (Gately, 1984). Thus, to clarify which 
theoretical market structure can explain the mechanisms of oil market, the strong effect of OPEC 
decisions and activities have to be studied. 
One possible way to describe the market mechanisms would be to define OPEC as the powerful 
cartel of the market and non-OPEC producers as the large group of competitive producers, which 
has been suggested by Griffin (1985). In other words, what explains the market would be 
dominant producer model with a competitive fringe (Aune et al., 2010). The explanation ability 
of this model however, has been questioned during different periods of time.  
Alhajji and Huettner (2000) point at six cartel characteristics that cannot be found in OPEC so 
their results do not show enough evidence to support the cartel model as an acceptable 
explanation for OPEC behavior. Hamilton (2008) suggests that OPEC cannot be treated as a 
traditional cartel, as the profit maximization method they use is much different from the method 
that an effective cartel would use. Hansen and Lindholt (2008) approve the competitive model as 
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a good choice of model to describe non-OPEC behavior, but about OPEC behavior they have 
two different results. In their model from 1973 to 2001, they can support the dominant producer 
model as a good choice for explaining OPEC production behavior, but not before that time 
period (Hansen and Lindholt, 2008). 
Regardless of what their different results suggest, both groups seem to agree that OPEC has 
some market power. They suggest that there has been a change in OPEC’s role in the market. 
Also, small producers have been trying to increase their exploration and non-OPEC supply has 
been increasing, which means the competition between them has increased (Ramcharran, 2002), 
so he approves that the competitive model for analyzing non-OPEC behavior would be an 
acceptable model. Therefore, dominant producer and competitive fringe model, which was 
applied by Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2013) and also used by Golombek et al. (2013) will be the 
acceptable approach for this research. To have a better insight of recent production situation in 
OPEC, figure 1 shows that between twelve members of the dominant producer (OPEC) Saudi 
Arabia had the highest oil production and Ecuador had the lowest amount of production in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 1: OPEC Production in 2012, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
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The second characteristic that needs to be clarified would be the main producers in oil market. 
Discussing the market structure has already provided a background of this feature, but looking at 
the fluctuations in oil production and production reserves during the last decades can give a 
better insight of the market. Figure 2 shows that from 1960 to 1972 and from 1975 to 2012, non-
OPEC production
2
 has been higher than OPEC production. Also, two major production reduction 
by OPEC can be seen, which refer to Arab oil embargo in 1973 (Dahl, 2004) and Iranian 
revolution in 1979 (Hamilton, 2011) and the latter continued until 1985 mainly because of Iran-
Iraq war (Dahl, 2004). Non-OPEC production has been increasing from 1965 to 2001, but from 
2002 to 2008 they have decreased their production with a mild slope.  
 
 
Figure 2: World Oil Production, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
 
While non-OPEC production have been increasing during the last decades, figure 3 shows that 
from 1980 to 1998, the proved reserves of these producers has not dramatically changed. 
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1998 to 1999 non-OPEC proved reserves were increased from 198.0 thousand million barrels to 
329.6 thousand million barrels. The reason of this increase was that in 1999 British Petroleum 
decided to include more of Canadian oil sand reserves in the oil reserves. After 1999, non-OPEC 
proved reserves have increased with a mild slope. OPEC proved reserves however, have been 
increasing with a steep slope and as Golombek et al. (2013) suggest this can be considered a 
competitive advantage of OPEC. 
 
 
Figure 3: Proved Reserves, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
 
The distribution of market share between different oil producers would be the final step to see 
which countries are the main producers. According to figure 4, the OPEC share of total oil 
production in 2012 was 43% (13.3% was provided by Saudi Arabia), and the non-OPEC 
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with 12.8%, the US with 9.6%, and China with 5.0% had the highest share of total production
4
, 
so after OPEC they were the main oil producers in 2012. 
 
 
Figure 4: Share of Total Production in 2012, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
 
The main oil consumer countries and the major use of oil are the next characteristics that should 
be described. A country based comparison in 2012 shows that three countries together consumed 
more than one third of total oil that had been supplied in that year. The US with 20% share of 
total consumption had the highest oil consumption, China with 12% and Japan with 5% share of 
total consumption were the next two countries with high consumption (Figure 5
5
). Also, a sector 
based comparison shows that as the major demand sector, more than half of the oil demand 
(53%) is focused on transportation, while 20% of the demand is concentrated on industry sector 
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(14% petrochemicals, 6% other industry) and 9% of the demand is for the buildings (Figure 6) 
(IEA, 2013). 
 
Figure 5: Share of Total Oil Consumption, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
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Figure 6: Share of Oil Demand by Sector, Source: IEA 2013. World Energy Outlook 2012, Page 511 OECD/IEA, Paris6 
 
The main purpose of reviewing the oil market general features is to prepare the basis of this 
research. The main variable of interest however, has not been discussed yet. The short term and 
long term effects of oil price fluctuations on non-OPEC oil production is investigated here. But 
no investigation can begin without looking at the variable itself. Figure 7 shows the crude oil 
fluctuations starting from 1960 that OPEC was formed to 2012 which is the last year of 
estimations in this research. 
 The first major increase in oil price after OPEC establishment is from 1973 (17 US dollar)
7
 to 
1974 (54 US dollar), which took place after OPEC embargo on oil export and their following oil 
production decrease (Hamilton, 2011). The next increase in oil price occurred from 1978 (49 US 
dollar) to 1979 (100 US dollar) when the Iranian revolution took place (Hamilton, 2011). In 1980 
when the war between Iran and Iraq began and the following price collapse happened (Hamilton, 
2011) . The price of crude oil was decreased from 103 US dollar in 1980 to 59 US dollar in 1985 
and it collapsed to 30 US dollar in 1986. The reason of this collapse was that in order to keep a 
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 The data on oil demand in 2012 was used (which is given in table 15.4) to calculate the share of oil demand by 
sector. 
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high oil price, Saudi Arabia no longer wanted to cut back on its production (Hamilton, 2011). 
From 1986 to 2007, three price changes can be mentioned. First, the price increase for 8 US 
dollars from 1989 to 1990, when the first Persian Gulf War in 1990 took place. The next two 
major changes occurred in 2008 and they were the large demand for energy by China and the 
financial crisis. The oil price increased from 36 US dollar in 2003 to 104 US dollar in 2008 and 
declined to 66 US dollar in 2009, thus a turning point took place in the price in 2008. 
34-42 
 
Figure 7: Crude Oil Price, Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2013 
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differently to price changes. Based on another estimation for the period of 1973-1997, 
Ramcharran (2002) showed that the price elasticity of non-OPEC supply was low but he also 
mentioned that these producers have been increasing their supply, which is one of the challenges 
for OPEC.  
Among different studies on global oil supply, Krichene (2002) used the data from 1918 to 1999 
and in his results the short run price elasticity was negative and very low, while in long run it 
was positive and higher than short run price elasticity. For the time period of 1974-2001, Hansen 
and Lindholt (2008) estimated the price elasticity of both oil demand (which was equal to -0.01) 
and non-OPEC supply (equal to 0.38), so they suggested that non-OPEC supply was inelastic 
toward price changes. Dées et al. (2007) also suggested that the price elasticity of demand and 
non-OPEC supply was low in their research. In an estimation on a shorter time period (200-
2006), Askari and Krichene (2008) also showed the similar results and Hamilton (2008) 
mentioned that in short term, the price elasticity of oil supply and oil demand are low. Askari and 
Krichene (2010) used quarterly data from 1970 to 2008 and found inelastic supply toward price 
changes in long run. In another research, Golombek et al. (2013) used quarterly data, their data 
set was from 1980 to 2009 and their results also showed that non-OPEC supply is price inelastic. 
Some other studies have been more specific and focused on activities relevant to supply by non-
OPEC. In long run, non-OPEC price elasticity for rig oil was found to be very close to one by 
Ringlund et al. (2008). Dahl and Duggan (1998) estimated the price elasticity of oil exploration 
in the US, which is higher than one. In another estimation for the time period of 1950-1995, 
Farzin (2001) showed that price elasticity of oil reserves in the US is small but significant. 
What the previous studies have in common is the inelasticity of non-OPEC supply in short term 
and also the inelasticity of demand toward price changes. the next chapters are dedicated to 
theoretical and empirical guidelines for designing a model and estimating the price elasticity of 
non-OPEC supply in the period of 1965-2012 (the starting year varies in some of the estimated 
models and they will be discussed in chapter 4). 
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3. Theory  
 
In this chapter, the most relevant theories that have been used to analyze world oil market are 
reviewed. Among these theories, the ones that are used in this research are pointed out and 
explained. Then the theoretical model will be formed for both supply and demand side. Oil 
supply is more focused, as the research is concerned with price elasticity of oil supply. But oil 
demand model is also mentioned, so some variables in this model can be used later. Which of 
them are used in this research and why they are chosen is discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
3.1. Relevant theories applied in this research 
 
The first theory that helps to explain oil producers’ behavior and decisions about production is 
producer theory. In addition to minimizing their costs at each production level, producers try to 
find the optimal production level. So they will be able to maximize their profits, which is what 
they are mainly concern with when they decide about their activities.  
As the general profit function suggests, at each level of production the price affects the profits 
positively and costs affect them negatively. 
π = f (price+, costs-)   
Max π(p,w) = py  - wx  subject to: f(x) ≥ y  (Varian, 1992)   
Where p is the price of product, y is output, w is the price of input (typically, there would be 
more than one input so wx indicates each input multiplied by its price), x is input and f(x) is 
production function.  
But this general form needs to be slightly changed so it can be applied for estimating oil supply 
function: 
Max π(p, k) = py  - c(y, k)   (1) 
17 
 
Where p is crude oil price, y is output (crude oil ready to be supplied), and c is the cost of 
production, which is a function of y and an exogenous factor k.
 8
 
The reason this exogenous factor is included would be to see how the production costs could be 
affected by it. c (y, k) is assumed to be strictly convex in y so by deriving the First Order 
Condition, marginal costs will be increasing. In the next section and after deriving the oil supply 
function, the change in production caused by an exogenous factor will be analyzed. 
The variables involved in profit maximization problem can lead to the theoretical supply model, 
which is a basis for the empirical supply models that are applied in this research. But before 
explaining that, the main factor that current supply is driven by must be focused on, and that is 
the producers’ previous investments. How much they invested in the last years highly affect their 
supply in current period, and their investments are determined based on their price expectations. 
In theory, the producers have more than one possible way to take oil price into account. Thus the 
question here is that in practice how do they expect the prices to be in the near future? A short 
comparison between different expectation theories can help to answer this question.  
Non-OPEC producers’ current expectation of oil price in next year might strongly be based on 
what has taken place in the past in oil market. When they set their expectations with respect to 
last year’s oil price, they have shown one type of adaptive expectations (Farzin, 2001). Another 
type of this approach would be when the producers form their expectations based on historical 
prices over many years. The advantage of relying on adaptive expectation theory in this research 
is data availability, since the data of previous year is easily accessible and by including lagged 
variables they can be taken into account. But the behavioral interpretation this approach gives 
might be challenged when comparing it to rational expectation theory. So the next question is if 
non-OPEC producers take any other information into account to set their expectation about the 
oil price in the future. 
Rational expectation theory suggests that producers can use market information to form their 
expectation closer to what will happen in the future (Krichene, 2002) and (Dahl and Duggan, 
                                                 
8
 Costs could be considered a function of  y and also accumulated supply. But the theoretical model here is static and 
including accumulated supply requires a dynamic profit function. In chapter 4 the accumulated supply is defined and 
it is also included but not as an explanatory variable for production costs. 
18 
 
1998) and (Hamilton, 2008). This approach may give different results compare to adaptive 
expectation approach but to some extent it is complicated to be applied. 
 The first challenge is that the data of oil price in the future might not be easily available, which 
can cause some problems for the econometric model in the research. The second challenge is the 
quality of data that non-OPEC can receive about the possible changes in oil price in the future. 
Both of these problems are caused by asymmetric information (Aune et al., 2010), which can be 
a result of oil market structure. 
 Bounded rationality model could be able to explain this kind of limitation, which is caused by 
uncertainty in the market (Gately, 1984). Compare to other approaches that have been 
mentioned, bounded rationality could give a better insight of how non-OPEC suppliers decide 
about possible changes of oil price in the near future. However, the advantage of applicability 
makes adaptive expectation be the selected approach in this research.  
 
3.2. Theoretical model 
3.2.1. Oil supply 
 
The first step to build an empirical model set has been taken by defining the profit function and 
its explanatory variables. Now that the relationship between oil profits and each of the right hand 
side variables has been clarified, the next step is to derive supply function by satisfying the First 
Order Conditions (F.O.C.) of the profit function. In order to do this, we need to differentiate the 
profit function with respect to y, which gives output supply function: 
∂π / ∂y = ∂(py) / ∂y - ∂c(y, k) / ∂y    (2) 
To satisfy F.O.C, the left hand side should be equal to zero, so we would have: 
∂π / ∂x = p – ∂c(y, k) / ∂y = 0     (3) 
Therefore the price will be equal to marginal costs: 
p = ∂c(y, k) / ∂y    (4) 
19 
 
So the theory suggests if price increases the marginal costs also increases. As mentioned before, 
the cost function is assumed to be strictly convex in y so the marginal cost would be upward 
sloping. Given that price is constant, figure 1 shows how a shift in marginal cost affects the 
production. Assume that the exogenous factor k is the cost of renting rigs or some other input 
prices. If k increases, marginal cost (MC) will shift up from MC1 to MC2 and at the same level of 
price P1 the oil producers will reduce their supply (point A). The figure also shows that at the 
same level of marginal cost MC1 if price shifts up from P1 to P2 they will increase their supply 
(point B). Therefore, the theoretical supply function would be:  
Supply = S (P
+
, C
-
)    (5) 
Figure 8 
 
 
3.2.2. Oil demand 
 
The oil demand function may be derived from utility maximization problem and also from the 
profit maximizing problem of firms that use oil as their input. But as the demand model is not the 
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only be discussed based on other researches. 
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According to consumer theory, the demand of a good is a function of its price, income and also 
the price of substitute good (Varian, 1992). This form of demand, which is known as Marshallian 
demand (Silberberg and Suen, 2000), has been applied for studying oil demand function 
(Kennedy, 1974). In this research, the oil demand that is referred to is in macroeconomic level 
and when the oil demand of countries is focused on, income of these countries should be 
included in the model. (Yang et al., 2002), (Narayan and Smyth, 2007) and (Kilian, 2009). The 
last variable in the theoretical demand model is the price of substitutes, which can vary with 
respect to the consuming sector.  
Demand = f (Po, GDP, Ps)      (6) 
Where Po is oil price and Ps is the price of substitutes. The key variables in demand function are 
used in the supply model as Instrumental variables for oil price. The technique and also the 
choice of variable will be discussed in chapter 5. 
4. Methodology 
 
For analyzing how non-OPEC countries respond to a price change, an econometric model set is 
needed. To achieve such a specific model set, the mechanisms of oil market and the relevant 
theoretical concepts will only be useful if a road map clarifies how to apply the theories on the 
mechanisms and dynamics. What comes next is the necessary material to build this model set, in 
which the price elasticity of oil supply by non-OPEC producers can be estimated. 
 
4.1. Empirical model specification 
 
The supply model discussed in section 3.2.1 is a theoretical basis that shows how oil is being 
supplied. The estimations will be possible when the theory makes an actual tool that one can use 
as a magnifying glass and see what happens as a result of a particular price change and measure 
the impact of it on oil supply. An empirical model that is educed from theoretical supply model 
would make this possible. For determining such an econometric model, its functional form needs 
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to be chosen. The nature of explanatory variables can help to find a proper functional form to 
estimate the price elasticity. And all these will be simplified by defining the basic assumptions of 
the model. Thus, the section shall begin with the assumptions and continues with choosing 
variables, and then choosing the functional form. 
 
4.1.1. Assumptions  
 
The first assumption is concerned with the market forces that set the crude oil price. The changes 
in oil demand that are derived by the fluctuations of income are able to cause changes in oil price 
(Hamilton, 2008) and (Golombek et al., 2013). Also, the capacity and ability of producers to 
increase the supply are two of the major factors to force the price to change (Hamilton, 2008) 
and (Wurzel and Ollivaud, 2009). The next important factor is the power of OPEC and the effect 
of their decisions on oil price (Ramcharran, 2002) which is highly affected by political forces in 
member countries (Gately, 1984). Many other factors could be included in market forces, but 
what has been mentioned is sufficient to frame the first assumption: 
1. Price is given for individual non-OPEC oil producers (set by the market forces) but the 
exogeneity of this variable will be more discussed in chapter 5. 
The second assumption indicates which type of model is applied to estimate the price elasticity 
and which factors determine it. Hotelling’s rule explains how the oil price is affected by its non-
renewability, but the rule is not used in this research and it may raise the question whether the 
model will be static. The amount of supply in one period affects the profit of the next period and 
this is not taken into account in the theoretical supply model, so this model is static. However, all 
of the empirical models that are estimated here include lagged variable (one year lagged supply) 
and one of them also contains accumulated supply, which implied that the empirical model is 
dynamic. So the next assumption is: 
2. The theoretical model is static, but the empirical model set can be considered dynamic, 
without using Hotelling’s rule. 
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Both of the explanatory variables that have been discussed in theoretical supply model will be 
involved in empirical model, as well. By having the production costs in the model, the question 
that should be answered is about the currency and whether the exchange rate has to be included 
in the model or not. If the countries were being studied separately, exchange rate would be one 
of the explanatory variables for showing the effects of its changes on the left hand side variable. 
However, non-OPEC producers are focused on as one group and they take the price as given in 
US dollar. So the next assumption is: 
3. Oil price, production costs, GDP, coal price, and natural gas price are in US dollar and the 
models do not include exchange rate. 
4. The initial empirical model starts from 1965. However, when the data for one of the 
explanatory variables is not available from 1965 that specific model will have a different 
starting point, which will be explained with more details in section 4.3. 
 
4.1.2. Variables  
 
After defining the assumptions, the variables of the model set can be chosen and briefly 
described: 
 Oil supply: St 
The model is designed as the supply function, so the left hand side variable is oil supply and it 
will be explained by the estimation results in chapter 5.  
 Lagged supply: St-1 
The first explanatory variable is one year lagged supply, to estimate how much the oil supply in 
current year is affected by the previous year’s supply. Each year’s production indicates both the 
ability and the willingness of a producer to produce and supply oil in that year. In their models to 
estimate the supply and demand Krichene (2002) and Askari and Krichene (2010) have used 
lagged variables including lagged supply, as it can help to indicate the adjustment dynamics in 
the market (Krichene, 2002). In this research, the choice of variable to take these dynamics into 
account is one year lagged supply.  
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 Price: Pt 
Oil price as the main focus is the next explanatory variable. All of the models include oil price, 
since this variable will answer the question of how non-OPEC countries respond to price 
changes. The theory suggests that an increase in oil price causes an increase in profits, which 
leads to higher production. So this explanatory variable is expected to have positive sign in the 
results. 
 Accumulated supply: ASt 
Accumulated supply can affect the current supply in two different ways. Due to discounting, the 
oil producers prefer to delay one part of the costs by extracting the cheapest resources first. The 
more they have produced before (more accumulated supply), the more they have to extract from 
the expensive resources, which means that accumulated supply affects the current supply 
negatively via production costs. But it also affects supply positively, since the more accumulated 
supply implied that the producer has prepared more infrastructures for oil production and supply. 
So clarifying the expected sign of this variable is not as straightforward as others because of 
these two effects that are in two different directions. 
ASt = S0 + S1 + S2 + … + St-2 + St-1    (7) 
In each year, accumulated supply is equal to the total supply from the estimation starting point 
until the year before. 
 Proved reserves: Rt 
As Holland (2008) suggests, When additional reserves are discovered, oil production will be 
affected positively. So proved reserves are relevant for the model set that estimates the supply.  
 Production costs: Ct 
Production costs are defined as the summation of lifting costs, finding and development costs. 
EIA (2011b)  gives regional lifting costs and also finding and development costs separately and 
in eight groups: United Stated (US), Canada (CA), Europe (EU), Former Soviet Union (FSU), 
Africa (A), Middle East (ME), and the rest of countries are in groups of Other Eastern 
Hemisphere (OEH) and Other Western Hemisphere (OWH). Depending on the type of data that 
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is used in each model (time series data or panel data) the costs will be taken into account in two 
different ways.  
In time series analysis, aggregate data has been inserted in the model so the weighted mean of 
production costs will be used. In this case, the weighted average costs in one year are equal to:  
Ct = ((CUS * SUS) + (CCA * SCA) + (CEU * SEU) + (CFSU * SFSU) + (CA * SA) 
               + (CME * SME) + (COEH * SOEH) + (COWH * SOWH)) / SNO   (8) 
Where Ct shows the annual weighted average costs production of non-OPEC producers, CUS is 
the summation of US lifting costs and finding and development costs, SUS is the annual US oil 
supply (oil production given by BP statistical review is used as supply) and SNO is the annual oil 
supply by non-OPEC. The costs of each region are multiplied by its supply and the summation of 
all of them is divided by non-OPEC oil supply. 
In panel data analysis, production costs of each non-OPEC supplier are needed (disaggregate 
data), but only the regional data are available. So for each country, the data of the region it is 
located in will be used, which again raises the matter of cost data accuracy. 
Some of the challenges this variable may cause will be tested to make sure if it fits the model 
sets or not. But even with the accuracy issue it is expected to have negative sign in the results. 
 Instrumental variables 
1) Gross Domestic Production 
2) Coal price: defined as the average of Northwest Europe marker price, US Central 
Appalachian coal spot price index, and Japan steam coal import cif price 
3) Natural gas price: defined as the average of LNG Japan cif, Average German import 
price, and US Henry Hub 
The reason why these instrumental variables are included in the models is explained in chapter 5. 
 
4.1.3. Functional form 
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The equation maid by the explanatory variables should aim to estimate the price elasticity of oil 
supply. So the priority would be to choose the functional form that gives a straightforward 
estimation of the price elasticity. 
Back to the theoretical model, the supply function was: 
Supply = S (P
+
, C
-
)    (5) 
St = k * (Pt)
 β
 *... * εt    (9) 
As Griffin (1985) and Ramcharran (2002) and also Askari and Krichene (2010) suggestes, one 
possible way is to take the natural logarithm of both left hand side variable and right hand side 
variables. 
ln St = k + β ln Pt + … + εt    (10) 
The advantage of this empirical model is in the definition of price elasticity of supply. Based on 
the definition, the price elasticity of oil supply shows how much the supply changes by on unit 
change in price. In equation 10, taking the partial derivative of ln St with respect to ln Pt gives: 
∂ ln St / ∂ ln Pt = β   (11) 
The left hand side is equal to: 
((1 / St) * (∂St / ∂ Pt)) / (1 / Pt)   (12) 
Which is the exactly price elasticity of oil supply, so: 
 β = (Pt / St) * (∂St / ∂ Pt)   (13) 
Now the other explanatory variables can be added to the initial model
9
.  
ln St = k + α ln St-1 + β ln Pt + γ ln ASt + δ ln Rt + λ ln Ct + εt  (14) 
What has been achieved is a double log supply function, which is linear in parameters. 
                                                 
9
 Two basic conditions for choosing the estimated models are described in chapter 5. The model that included all of 
the explanatory variables (equation 14) does not satisfy the two conditions and is not discussed in chapter 5. 
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4.2. Data 
 
The data needed for the variables are provided by four data sources:  
1. BP statistical review (BP, 2013) 
2. World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2013) 
3. International Energy outlook (EIA, 2011a) and (EIA, 2014) 
4. World Development Indicators data base (WDI, 2014) 
The summary statistics of all the variables are shown in table 1. For the annual model set, BP 
statistical review provides both aggregate and disaggregate data on supply (oil production is used 
for supply), oil price and proved reserves (Data is from the end of each year). The data on costs 
are provided by U.S. Energy Information Administration, and the data on GDP is provided by 
World Development Indictor. For the quarterly model set, the data on oil supply and price are 
from U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
The time period of available data varies from one variable to the other and also from one data 
source to the other. In time series analysis, the aggregate data is available as follows: 
Annual oil production data given by BP statistical review (used for the left hand side variable) 
are available from 1965 to 2012, which means both lagged and accumulated supply are available 
from 1966 to 2012. Annual crude oil price and annual GDP are available from 1965 to 2012. 
Annual proved reserves also provided by BP statistical review are available from 1980 to 2012 
and annual production costs are from 1981 to 2009. Coal price is available for 1987 to 2012 and 
natural gas price is available from 1984 to 2012, and both of these are provided by BP statistics. 
Quarterly oil production data are available from 1994Q1
10
 to 2013Q3, so lagged supply and 
accumulated supply are available from 1994Q2 to 2013Q3. Price is also available from 1994Q1 to 
2013Q3. The quarterly data are provided by EIA and the data on other variables could not be 
found for the focused time period of this research. 
In panel data analysis, the models only estimate annual supply function and not the quarterly 
supply function. Annual data on oil production, proved reserves, and production costs are not 
                                                 
10
 The first quarter of 1994 
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available for some countries in the first years of estimation and for some others in the end of the 
estimation period. When the data for all countries during the whole estimation period are not 
available it will leads to an unbalanced panel data model (Wooldridge, 2009). The time period of 
the data which is used for crude oil price is the same as time series (1965-2012). 
In the data set that is used for all of the variables in time series, both current members and former 
members of OPEC are excluded.
11
 Also, Former Soviet Union is excluded from the data set. 
The data availability is taken into account as a constraint in each model. 
Table 1: Data summary 
Variable 
Number of 
observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max Source 
Year 48 1988.5 14 1965 2012 . 
S 48 28044.14 7207.947 13019.01 36117.84 
BP 
statistics 
AS 47 55051.34 15329.83 13019.01 71940.44 
BP 
statistics 
P 48 46.46161 29.65529 10.63755 113.558 
BP 
statistics 
R 33 258.8073 59.72759 191.0156 331.0214 
BP 
statistics 
C 29 10.11718 4.64239 5.37119 24.71736 EIA 
GDP 48 2.47e+14 1.07e+14 9.05e+13 4.83e+14 WDI 
NGP 29 5.939882     2.251375    3.345234    11.71563 
BP 
statistics 
CP 26 68.35016           23.42308 43.28413 138.3694 
BP 
statistics 
 
In table 1, oil production (used for supply) is thousand barrels daily production, Crude oil price is 
based on 2012 US dollars per barrel of oil production, proved reserves are in thousand million 
barrels at the end of each year, production costs are based on 2005 USD per barrel of oil 
equivalent. GDP, coal price and natural gas price are based on 2012 US dollars. 
                                                 
11
 In the initial estimations, the former members of OPEC were included in both time series analysis and panel data 
analysis. Later on, the former members were excluded from the time series to improve the models. But due to the 
time constraint, the panel data was not modified. This is considered one of the weaknesses of model 5 and model 6. 
Former Soviet Union is excluded from both time series and panel data. 
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4.3. Methods 
 
By clarifying the assumptions and variables, the functional form and also data sources, all 
requirements for estimating the price elasticity of oil supply by non-OPEC countries are ready. 
Now the last step for achieving the results would be to illustrate different methods that are 
applied and also to choose the final empirical models with respect to the initial results. Each 
method has been tried with all of the possible combinations of the explanatory variables. What 
comes next includes the selected models that provided acceptable results in the initial 
estimations. 
 
4.3.1. Time series analysis using aggregate data 
 
The first model set includes two possible combinations of variables that gave acceptable results 
by using annual aggregate data. What these two have been selected by are the expected signs and 
also the estimated coefficients of the right hand side variables.   
Model 1 shows the oil supply as a function of supply in the previous year, oil price, proved 
reserves, and production costs. In this model, a time constraint has been introduced to avoid the 
years that proved reserves data are not available for. Thus, the estimation starts from 1980.  
Model no.1: ln St = k + α ln St-1 + β ln Pt + δ ln Rt + λ lnCt + εt 
Model 2 indicates that oil supply in each year can be a function of one year lagged supply, price 
and production costs. The time constraint in this case requires the estimation to begin from 1981, 
since the data on costs are not available before this year. But to avoid the number of observations 
to become small, this model estimates the oil supply function until 2012. So unavailability of 
data on costs after 2009 has not been taken into account as an applicable constraint.  
Model no.2: ln St = k + α ln St-1 + β ln Pt + λ lnCt + εt 
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The models that use quarterly time series for estimations form the second model set. Each model 
includes three dummy variables because the seasonal effects need to be defined for the model. 
Model 3 and model 4 estimate the supply function from 1994Q1 to 2013Q3. 
Model no.3: ln St = k + α ln St-1 + β ln Pt + μ1 Q1 + μ2 Q2 + μ3 Q3 + εt 
Model no.4: ln St = k + α ln St-1 + β ln Pt + γ ln ASt + μ1 Q1 + μ2 Q2 + μ3 Q3+ εt 
The estimation method in these four models is Ordinary Least Square (OLS).  
4.3.2. Panel data analysis using disaggregate data 
 
Having both estimations on aggregate data and disaggregate data allow us to compare the results 
of time series analysis with panel data analysis and find out if there is any difference between 
these two in the estimated time period. 
Both of the models estimation period is annual and from 1965 to 2012 and they eliminate the 
unobserved effects but in two different methods. Model 5 is a random effects model (RE), in 
which the key assumption is that there is no correlation between the unobserved effect with each 
of the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2009). Model 6, fixed effects model (FE), has a lot in 
common with model 5 but when it comes to the relationship between the right hand side 
variables, it only assumes that there is no perfect linear relationship between the explanatory 
variables (Wooldridge, 2009) and it does not include the unobserved effects in the assumption.  
Model no.5 RE:   ln Sit = k + α ln Sit-1 + β ln Pit + λ lnCit + μ1 Y1 + μ2 Y2 + … + μt-1 Yt-1 + ai + εit 
Model no.6 FE:   ln Sit = k + α ln Sit-1 + β ln Pit + μ1 Y1 + μ2 Y2 + … + μt-1 Yt-1 + ai + εit 
Where Y1i is the dummy variable of the first year of estimation for country i and ai shows the 
unobserved effect. 
Before discussing the results of these models, two points about the distribution of errors need to 
be mentioned.  First, the number of observations in the models with aggregate data is not very 
large. In the next chapter, the errors in these four models will be tested to find out whether their 
distribution is close to normality or not. Second, one of the OLS assumptions is that the errors 
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are independent from the right hand side variables. However in all of the models, the existence of 
lagged dependent variable causes this assumption to be asymptotically satisfied. 
5. Results 
A comparison between the results of time series analysis and panel data analysis would make it 
possible to find out the differences between the abilities of these two for explaining the oil 
production behavior of non-OPEC. But the main focus of this research is on the models with 
aggregate data. Thus, time series analysis is discussed more detailed, with more testes to find out 
the possible issues the models may suffer from. The chapter begins with describing the 
estimation results of all six models and continues with relevant tests in time series analysis and 
also some suggestions to improve the models. 
 
5.1. Estimation results’ analysis 
 
The results in this section can be used to discover which model would be a better basis for 
analyzing non-OPEC producers’ behavior. Studying the features of these models gives an insight 
of their strengths and weaknesses. The strengths can help to design a model that gives a better 
explanation of these producers’ behavior and identify each model’s weaknesses can be useful to 
find a more accurate estimation method. Some of these methods will be mentioned later, and one 
of them will be applied to see how it changes the results. First, each model is briefly explained, 
then they will be compared. And finally the tests’ results will be discussed. 
The models that come next meet the two basic conditions:   
1) As explained in section 4.1.3 a double log model provides the percentage change in 
dependent variable when the independent variable changes one percent. Having lagged 
dependent variable (one year lagged supply) in such a model with this functional form 
means the coefficient of lagged variable must be: 
0 < β < 1 
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2) The logic behind the expected sign of each variable has been mentioned in chapter 4. 
What the estimation results provide are supposed to meet this condition. Thus, when the 
initial result of a model showed unexpected signs in more than one coefficient, the model 
was modified. But some results that are slightly unexpected are included in this chapter, 
since the real market is not expected to be exactly the same as the theory suggests. The 
models with negative coefficient of oil price are excluded from the model set. 
Tale 2 shows the results of estimations in all models that satisfied these two conditions. 
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Table 212: Estimation results 
Model set 
 
Estimates 
Time series analysis Panel data analysis Time series using IV 
Annual aggregate Quarterly aggregate Annual disaggregate Annual aggregate 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
k 
0.640 
(1.12) 
1.067 
(3.49) 
1.067 
(3.49) 
0.226 
(0.96) 
0.261 
(1.08) 
-0.386 
(-0.84) 
0.357 
(2.79) 
0.612 
(0.87) 
1.077 
(3.04) 
α 
0.953 
(14.37) 
0.900 
(31.75) 
0.900 
(31.75) 
0.979 
(43.10) 
0.968 
(33.29) 
0.944 
(65.56) 
0.917 
(54.20) 
0.956 
 (11.89) 
0.899 
 (26.81) 
β 
0.015 
(0.82) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.167 
(1.50) 
0.029 
(1.07) 
0.016 
 (0.66) 
0.008 
 (0.41) 
γ . . . . 
0.008 
(0.66) 
. . 
. 
 
. 
 
δ 
-0.27 
(-0.89) 
. . . . . . 
-0.028 
 (-0.81) 
. 
λ 
-0.022 
(-1.32) 
- 0.017 
(-1.10) 
-0.017 
(-1.10) 
. . 
0.008 
(0.43) 
. 
-0.024 
 (-1.12) 
- 0.021 
 (1.05) 
μ1 . . . 
– 0.013 
(-5.22) 
– 0.013 
(-5.15) 
. .   
μ2 . . . 
– 0.015 
(-5.92) 
– 0.014 
(-5.70) 
. .   
μ3 . . . 
– 0.012 
(-4.67) 
– 0.012 
(-4.66) 
. .   
 
                                                 
12
 T-values are shown in the parenthesis 
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In model 1 with annual data and 29 observations, lagged supply is positive and highly 
significant
13
, which shows that the change in current year’s supply is strongly affected by the 
changes in last year’s supply. To be more specific, 1% increase in lagged supply can increase the 
current supply by 0.95%. The coefficient of oil price is positive but insignificant, so this model 
could not find a significant effect of price shock on the non-OPEC supply. Model 1 also shows 
that if proved reserves were significant, 1% increase in this variable could reduce the oil supply 
by 0.03%.  But the coefficient is insignificant so not having the expected sign cannot cause a 
serious problem in the model. The coefficient of production costs has the expected sign but the 
model suggests that costs do not strongly affect the supply, since no significant effects of this 
variable could be found. 
Model 2 with 29 observations has two explanatory variables in common with model one, but it 
does not include proved reserves, as the variable had both incorrect sign and insignificant 
coefficient in the former model. According to this model, a 1% change in lagged supply leads to 
0.90% increase in current supply. The low test statistics show that both price and production 
costs enter insignificantly. So this model could not find any significant effects of price, neither. 
In the next two models quarterly data are used so the number of observations is higher than the 
two previous models. Model 3 with 78 observations includes lagged supply, oil price and three 
dummy variables to define and monitor the effect of the seasons. Lagged supply positively 
affects the current supply and when it changes by 1% the current supply will change by almost 
0.98%, which is higher than the former models. The model uses quarterly data so the high 
significance of lagged supply was expected, because the smaller the time steps are the higher the 
lagged effects will be. The price elasticity of supply is insignificant, as well as the first two 
models. 
Model 4 is also estimated using 78 observations and includes lagged supply and oil price. But the 
difference between this model and the former is that it includes accumulated supply. Both oil 
price and accumulated supply enter insignificantly, but lagged supply enters significantly. The 
model suggests that when the lagged supply increases by 1% the left hand side variable increases 
by 0.97%. All of the estimated seasonal effects are very significant in both model 3 and model 4. 
                                                 
13
 At 5% level of significance 
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In the next two models, panel data analysis has been applied and both of them include dummy 
variable to indicate the different years
14
. Random Effects model with 1102 observations suggests 
that the only significant variable of the model is lagged supply and by 1% change, this variable 
can increase the current supply by 0.94%. The oil price and production costs are insignificant 
and the latter does not have the expected sign. 
A fixed Effects model with 1648 observations has been estimated with production costs but the 
inclusion of this variable causes the model to show incorrect signs for both oil price and 
production costs. Thus, the selected model does not include costs and it shows that one year 
lagged supply enters significantly, whereas the oil price enters insignificantly. According to this 
model, a 1% increase in lagged supply leads to a 0.92% increase in current supply. 
Back to time series analysis, the first four models could not find a significant effect of oil price 
on the supply. Between various methods that can be used to improve the results, instrumental 
variables were chosen to be applied here. The reason this method is used is that the insignificant 
result of oil price might be caused by some endogeneity in the models. Thus instrumental 
variables could help to avoid this possible problem. A good choice of instrument for oil price 
would be a variable that affects price, and oil demand can satisfy this condition. But since the 
demand could not directly be used in the supply model, three explanatory variables of oil 
demand function were chosen: GDP, coal price and natural gas price. Several combinations of 
these three variables and one year lagged variable of each of them were applied (included in 
Appendix) to find out whether they can give more significant result on elasticity compare to the 
models in previous section. Model 7 and model 8 could satisfy the conditions that were 
mentioned in the beginning of the chapter. 
Model 7 and model 8 both are estimated using 26 observations. In both models the oil price is 
instrumented by the price of natural gas. The coefficients of one year lagged supply in both of 
these models are large and enter significantly, but in model 8 the coefficient of lagged supply is 
smaller than all of the other models. Model 7 suggests that a 1% increase in lagged supply causes 
0.96% increase in current supply and model 8 suggests that a 1% increase in one year lagged 
supply causes the current supply to increase by 0.90%. the coefficient of oil price eners 
                                                 
14
 The data on 42 countries are used in the panel data analysis. 
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insignificantly in both models, but model 7 is preferred because of the higher test statistic that it 
shows. The coefficient of proved reserves in model 7 is negative and insignificant. The 
coefficients of production costs are also negative and insignificant in both of these models. 
A comparison between the estimated models suggests that model 5 and model 6 showed better 
results for estimating the price elasticity. Some modification can improve the ability of these two 
models for estimating price elasticity and explaining the behavior of non-OPEC producers. 
Model 7 with the instrumental variables would be third model that may be improved. Suggested 
changes for some improvement are discussed in the next chapter. 
Finally, β estimates the short term price elasticity of supply. The long term price elasticity of 
non-OPEC supply can be calculated as shown below. Short term elasticity and long term 
elasticity are compared to find out if the short term elasticity was significant how big the 
difference would be between these two. 
βL = β / (1- α)  (Aune et al., 2005)   (15) 
Were β is the short term price elasticity of supply and βL is the long term price elasticity of 
supply. 
Given the estimated parameters, the long term price elasticity (as expected) is larger than the 
short term price elasticity in all of the models (table 3). Since βL is above one in model 5, it 
suggests that non-OPEC supply can be price elastic in long term. However the rest of the models 
suggest that even in long term the oil supply would be inelastic (between zero and one).
15
 
Table 3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
β 0.015 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.167 0.029 0.016 0.008 
βL 0.319 0.040 0.040 0.048 0.062 2.982 0.349 0.364 0.079 
 
 
                                                 
15
 The comparison in this table indicates what would be the difference between short term and long term elasticity if 
the estimated coefficients were significant. But β was not significant in all of the models, so what table 11 shows is 
indicative.  
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5.2. Relevant tests 
Now that the results of all models have been described, they should be tested to evaluate the 
ability of each model for studying the production behavior of the target group. Most of the tests 
are focused on model 1-4 using time series data. 
Test of joint significance 
 
T-test and the significance of each variable in one model is necessary to be mentioned but not 
enough to find out if the coefficients are jointly important for the model. In other words, the 
insignificance of one variable in a model does not necessarily mean the combination of the 
variables cannot explain the dependent variable. Test of joint significance (F-test) was used 
(Gujarati, 2003) to find out if the estimated parameters are jointly significant. 
Table 4 shows the results of F-test on all the models. Based on these results the combination of 
selected variables in each model is jointly significant. Thus there would be no evidence that any 
on them fails the first test. 
Table 4: Joint significance test 
Model Null Hypothesis
16
 F-statistics 
1 α = β = δ = λ = 0 435.47 
2 α =  β = λ  447.29 
3 α =  β = 0 3644.56 
4 α =  β = γ =0 2411.01 
5 α =  β = λ = 0 4599.24 
6 α =  β = 0 1522.82 
 
Multicollinearity test 
 
Table 5 presents the Variance-Inflating Factor (VIF) of each variable (Gujarati, 2003) in the four 
aggregate models. Based on the results shown in this table, VIF is low enough (lower than 10) so 
Multicollinearity is not a concern for the estimations in the models (Wooldridge, 2009).  
                                                 
16
 Estimated parameters are tested 
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Table 5: Variance-Inflating Factor17 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ln St-1 7.21 1.33 3.87 6.28 
ln Pt 9.57 5.50 3.87 3.96 
ln ASt . . . 2.72 
ln Rt 6.13 . . . 
ln Ct 5.53 4.99 . . 
Q1 . . 1.53 1.54 
Q2 . . 1.53 1.57 
Q3 . . 1.53 1.53 
Mean VIF 7.11 3.94 2.47 2.93 
 
Test of functional form 
 
The results of Ramsey RESET test (Ramsey, 1969) indicate that model 3 and model 4 have low 
F-statistics. Thus, the functional form is acceptable and there is no strong evidence that shows 
functional form misspecification (Wooldridge, 2009) in these two models. However, F-statistics 
in model 1 and model 2 are only high enough to approve the functional form in 10% level of 
significance.  
Table 6: Ramsey RESET test 
Model Test statistics Prob > F 
1 F(3, 26) =      4.01 0.0210 
2 F(3, 22) =      4.51 0.0130 
3 F(3, 69) =      0.63 0.6008 
4 F(3, 68) =      0.99 0.4048 
 
Normality test 
 
                                                 
17
 The estimates relate to dummy variables are not provided in the table 
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The number of observations in the first four models is not very high so the normality test can 
help to find out whether the distribution of estimated errors is close to normality or not. 
Comparing the distribution of error terms in these models shows that the errors of model one are 
most biased errors from the normal distribution. The other three have closer distribution to 
normality. 
 
Figure 9: Normality test on the errors in model 1 
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Figure 10: Normality test on the errors in model 2 
 
 
Figure 11: Normality test on the errors in model 3 
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Figure 12: Normality test on the errors in model 4 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity 
 
To see if any of the models suffer from heteroskedasticity, Breusch-Pagan test has been applied, 
in which the null hypothesis would be having constant variance in a model (Wooldridge, 2009). 
The results show that in the models with aggregate data there could not be found any strong 
evidence against homoscedasticity (table 7). So heteroskedasticity is not considered a major 
concern. 
Table 7: Result of Breuch-Pagan tests 
Model Test statistics Prob > χ2 
1 χ2 = 1.93 0.1649 
2 χ2 = 1.87 0.1717 
3 χ2 = 1.05 0.3053 
4 χ2 = 1.18 0.2766 
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Test of serial correlation 
 
A common problem in the models that use time series data is serial correlation, so the next step 
would be to apply Breusch-Pagan LM test (Wooldridge, 2009) to find out if any of the four 
models suffer from serial correlation. The null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation. 
According to table 8, while high test statistics in model 2 show that it may suffer from serial 
correlation (the null hypothesis can only be rejected at the 10% level of significance), low test 
statistics in the other three models do not give any strong evidence of this problem. 
Table 8: Results of Breusch-Godfrey LM test for serial correlation 
Model Test statistics Prob > χ2 
1 χ2 = 2.701 0.1003 
2 χ2 = 3.216 0.0729 
3 χ2 = 0.625 0.4292 
4 χ2 = 0.546 0.4600 
 
In model 2, the standard error can be improved by using Newey-West (or Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors)  but the estimation method will still be OLS 
(Verbeek, 2004). When using this method, the new standard error of lagged supply is lower than 
model 2, no difference could be observed in oil prices standard error, and costs standard error has 
slightly increased (the estimated coefficients are shown in table 2, model 2*). 
Stationarity test 
 
The next test can also be a major concern in the models with time series data and that is to find 
out whether the variables are stationary or not. Stationarity test helps to find out whether any of 
the variables have unit root or not, since ignoring unit root can cause spurious regression. When 
using annual data, a Dickey-Fuller test indicates that oil price and production costs are non-
stationary (Table 9). In the models with quarterly data, oil supply and oil price are non-stationary 
(Table 10). These estimated variables were also tested for trend stationarity with several lags but 
they were still non-stationary. 
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Table 9: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root the variables with annual data 
  Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
 Test statistics 1% Critical value 5% Critical value 10% Critical value 
ln St Z(t) = -8.335 -3.600 -2.938 -2.604 
ln Pt Z(t) = -1.403 -3.600 -2.938 -2.604 
ln Rt Z(t) = -0.647 -3.702 -2.980 -2.622 
ln Ct Z(t) = -0.091 -3.730 -2.992 -2.626 
 
Table 10: Dickey-Fuller test for unit root on the variables with quarterly data 
  Interpolated Dickey-Fuller 
 Test statistics 1% Critical value 5% Critical value 10% Critical value 
ln St Z(t) = -3.011 -4.088 -3.472 -3.163 
ln Pt Z(t) = -1.104 -3.541 -2.908 -2.589 
ln ASt Z(t) = -11.530 -3.542 -2.908 -2.589 
 
In order to achieve better results, the non-stationarity that was diagnosed in the previous chapter 
should be corrected. Two methods can be used to modify the models with non-stationary 
variables: differencing, or using the linear combination of stationary variables in the models. The 
former is recommended but due to the time constraint it was not applied here. 
 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this research, several econometric models were designed to estimate the short term and long 
term price elasticity of non-OPEC supply. The models were categorized in three groups: time 
series analysis using annual aggregate data, time series analysis using quarterly aggregate data, 
and panel data analysis with disaggregated data. By comparing the results of these models, some 
similarities were found. First, in all of the models current oil supply by non-OPEC was highly 
affected by how much they had supplied the year before, as the coefficient of lagged supply was 
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significant and very close to one. In other words, the value of the lagged supply coefficient 
showed a very high degree of persistence, because it was higher than 0.9 in all of the models. 
Second, the price elasticity of non-OPEC supply (estimated β) was insignificant in all of the 
models, meaning that no significant effect of price on oil production could be found. 
Another important point is that the difference between long term elasticity and short term 
elasticity is driven by the one year lagged supply (equation 15). For a given short term price 
elasticity, the higher the coefficient of one year lagged supply is, the higher the long term price 
elasticity will be. Thus, the higher the coefficient of one year lagged supply is, the larger the gap 
between short term and long term elasticity will be. 
To improve the estimated result of price elasticity, different methods can be used. The one that 
was applied here was to insert instrumental variables for oil price in the models. A variable that 
strongly affects the oil price could be a good instrumental variable. The changes of oil demand 
have an impact on oil price, but the demand could not directly be used. Thus three of the 
explanatory variables of demand were selected as instruments: GDP, coal price, and natural gas 
price. After using different combinations of these variables and also their one year lagged 
variables, some improvement could be seen in the estimated price elasticity but the results were 
still insignificant. Introducing instrumental variables can be considered one step forward for 
achieving significant price elasticity.  
One of the limitations of this research was the regional cost data that were used (in eight regions 
as explained in chapter 4). So having more detailed data on production costs would be another 
way to improve the results. The results of both time series analysis with aggregate data and panel 
data analysis with disaggregated data could be more accurate, if the data were available for each 
country and also in a longer period of time. One of the issues in both of the annual time series 
models (model 1 and model 2) was that the limited available data on costs made the number of 
observations even smaller. Thus, solving this issue could help to achieve better results. 
The next possible model improvement would be to estimate the price elasticity of oil supply by 
individual non-OPEC producers and also to define different groups among non-OPEC and 
estimate the elasticity of these groups. In supply models for individual countries, it would be 
possible to take the policies of each country into account, whereas in the model set with 
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aggregate data that was not possible. The economic policies, power shifts and different political 
decisions can highly affect the oil production of a country. Hence the existence of this factor in 
the model can be considered an advantage of estimating the supply for each country. 
For estimating the price elasticity, investment function of non-OPEC producers could also be 
considered an option. In this case, oil price would be one of the explanatory variables for the 
non-OPEC investment on oil production and the estimated coefficient of oil price is expected to 
have a positive sign. Lagged supply, which was highly significant in all of the estimated models 
here, can also be another explanatory variable. But the estimation weaknesses that could be 
caused by having supply as the left hand side variable and lagged supply on the right hand side 
(especially for the distribution of errors, discussed in chapter 4) can be easily avoided when the 
investment is the left hand side variable. 
Between the methods that are suggested in this chapter, various combinations of six instrumental 
variables were used (GDP, coal price, natural gas price, and one year lagged variable of each). 
Given the time constraint of the master thesis, the other methods and possible changes in the 
models are recommended for the future research. The estimates in the models with aggregate 
data did not show any significant results for price elasticity. But the results of panel data analysis 
showed some better results, since the test statistics of both model 5 and model 6 were close to the 
significance level. Model 7 with instrumental variable may also be improved by using some 
other instruments that were not found and applied in this research because of the time constraint. 
Therefore, the suggested changes in the models are expected to help in achieving more 
significant results. 
To sum up, the changes that are recommended for the further research will be: 
1) Improving the weaknesses this research suffered from including the data on production 
costs, small number of observations, and also the non-stationarity of oil price and 
production costs. 
2) Estimating the oil supply of each non-OPEC producer separately, taking the policies into 
account 
3) Estimating the price elasticity of non-OPEC supply in an investment function 
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Appendix 
 
The models in which oil price was instrumented can be found in this appendix.  
 
Table 11: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP 
 
 
Table 12: Regression results, price is instrumented by one year lagged GDP 
 
 
Table 13: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and one year lagged GDP 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5748242    .128423     4.48   0.000     .3231198    .8265286
       lnl1s     .9495282   .0155909    60.90   0.000     .9189707    .9800858
         lnp    -.0107183   .0110807    -0.97   0.333    -.0324361    .0109994
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .6175715   .1162455     5.31   0.000     .3897344    .8454085
       lnl1s     .9434277   .0137425    68.65   0.000      .916493    .9703624
         lnp     -.005377   .0092543    -0.58   0.561    -.0235151    .0127611
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .6543894   .1133329     5.77   0.000     .4322609    .8765178
       lnl1s     .9381734   .0132802    70.64   0.000     .9121447     .964202
         lnp    -.0007766   .0087656    -0.09   0.929    -.0179569    .0164038
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 14: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP 
 
 
Table 15: Regression results, price is instrumented by one year lagged GDP 
 
 
Table 16: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and one year lagged GDP 
 
 
Table 17: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1.006442   .5384573     1.87   0.062    -.0489151    2.061799
         lnr    -.0018905   .0347044    -0.05   0.957    -.0699099    .0661289
       lnl1s     .9076185   .0655348    13.85   0.000     .7791727    1.036064
         lnp    -.0070535   .0110659    -0.64   0.524    -.0287422    .0146352
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .6954309   .5386993     1.29   0.197    -.3604003    1.751262
         lnr     -.022212   .0347324    -0.64   0.522    -.0902864    .0458623
       lnl1s     .9457264   .0655756    14.42   0.000     .8172005    1.074252
         lnp     .0003308   .0111185     0.03   0.976    -.0214612    .0221227
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .9078054   .5327487     1.70   0.088    -.1363629    1.951974
         lnr    -.0083355    .034333    -0.24   0.808    -.0756269    .0589559
       lnl1s     .9197043   .0648368    14.18   0.000     .7926266    1.046782
         lnp    -.0047116   .0109351    -0.43   0.667     -.026144    .0167208
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.834982   13.99248    -0.13   0.896    -29.25975    25.58978
         lnc    -.2755682   1.239695    -0.22   0.824    -2.705327     2.15419
       lnl1s     1.147651   1.192746     0.96   0.336    -1.190089    3.485391
         lnp     .2497365   1.180222     0.21   0.832    -2.063455    2.562928
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 18: Regression results, price is instrumented by one year lagged GDP 
 
 
Table 19: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and one year lagged GDP 
 
 
Table 20: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price 
 
 
Table 21: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.796604   52.23212    -0.03   0.973    -104.1697    100.5765
         lnc     -.272162   4.635313    -0.06   0.953    -9.357209    8.812885
       lnl1s     1.144382   4.450213     0.26   0.797    -7.577876    9.866639
         lnp      .246493   4.413771     0.06   0.955     -8.40434    8.897326
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons    -1.827337   4.917484    -0.37   0.710    -11.46543    7.810755
         lnc    -.2748897   .4301407    -0.64   0.523     -1.11795    .5681705
       lnl1s        1.147   .4207116     2.73   0.006     .3224204     1.97158
         lnp     .2490904   .4088989     0.61   0.542    -.5523368    1.050518
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     1.081631   .3416178     3.17   0.002     .4120723    1.751189
       lnl1s     .8985065    .033068    27.17   0.000     .8336945    .9633185
         lnp    -.0046551   .0055465    -0.84   0.401     -.015526    .0062159
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .8665269   .5806285     1.49   0.136     -.271484    2.004538
         lnr    -.0135999   .0300644    -0.45   0.651    -.0725251    .0453252
       lnl1s     .9255482    .067575    13.70   0.000     .7931037    1.057993
         lnp     -.002117   .0084535    -0.25   0.802    -.0186856    .0144516
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 22: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price 
 
 
Table 23: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price 
 
 
Table 24: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 25: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons      1.08354   .3538615     3.06   0.002     .3899842    1.777096
         lnc    -.0198716   .0199722    -0.99   0.320    -.0590163    .0192732
       lnl1s     .8984998   .0335188    26.81   0.000     .8328042    .9641953
         lnp     .0065053   .0185714     0.35   0.726     -.029894    .0429046
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .7139582   .6914461     1.03   0.302    -.6412512    2.069168
         lnc    -.0198656   .0205955    -0.96   0.335    -.0602321    .0205009
         lnr    -.0229852   .0339241    -0.68   0.498    -.0894751    .0435048
       lnl1s      .944683   .0790905    11.94   0.000     .7896684    1.099698
         lnp     .0110909    .023425     0.47   0.636    -.0348212    .0570031
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .6907873   .3891977     1.77   0.076    -.0720262    1.453601
       lnl1s     .9369247   .0378227    24.77   0.000     .8627935    1.011056
         lnp     -.007265   .0051535    -1.41   0.159    -.0173657    .0028358
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .1674544   .5937514     0.28   0.778     -.996277    1.331186
         lnr    -.0302978   .0267001    -1.13   0.256    -.0826291    .0220334
       lnl1s     1.001327   .0671734    14.91   0.000     .8696692    1.132984
         lnp    -.0014277   .0074625    -0.19   0.848     -.016054    .0131986
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 26: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 27: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 28: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 29: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .6589386   .3677826     1.79   0.073     -.061902    1.379779
         lnc    -.0126384   .0164224    -0.77   0.442    -.0448257    .0195489
       lnl1s     .9418251    .035461    26.56   0.000     .8723229    1.011327
         lnp    -.0053604   .0156304    -0.34   0.732    -.0359953    .0252745
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .0493784   .6314261     0.08   0.938    -1.188194    1.286951
         lnc    -.0180183    .017038    -1.06   0.290    -.0514122    .0153756
         lnr    -.0337969   .0283416    -1.19   0.233    -.0893455    .0217517
       lnl1s     1.015387   .0710378    14.29   0.000     .8761558    1.154619
         lnp     .0065924   .0194979     0.34   0.735    -.0316227    .0448076
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .6830118    .388975     1.76   0.079    -.0793651    1.445389
       lnl1s     .9378372   .0377993    24.81   0.000     .8637519    1.011923
         lnp    -.0077269   .0051406    -1.50   0.133    -.0178023    .0023485
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons      .192451   .5931559     0.32   0.746    -.9701132    1.355015
         lnr    -.0285322    .026655    -1.07   0.284    -.0807751    .0237106
       lnl1s     .9982192   .0670995    14.88   0.000     .8667065    1.129732
         lnp    -.0020947   .0074428    -0.28   0.778    -.0166823    .0124929
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 30: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 31: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP and natural gas price and coal price 
 
 
Table 32: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP, natural gas price, lagged gas price, coal price 
and lagged coal price 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .6737161   .3663528     1.84   0.066    -.0443222    1.391754
         lnc    -.0069188    .015951    -0.43   0.664    -.0381822    .0243445
       lnl1s     .9412618    .035333    26.64   0.000     .8720104    1.010513
         lnp    -.0112688   .0151106    -0.75   0.456    -.0408851    .0183475
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .2036119   .6219947     0.33   0.743    -1.015475    1.422699
         lnc    -.0117107   .0165387    -0.71   0.479    -.0441259    .0207045
         lnr    -.0259706   .0278315    -0.93   0.351    -.0805193    .0285782
       lnl1s     .9978541   .0699603    14.26   0.000     .8607344    1.134974
         lnp    -.0014044   .0188124    -0.07   0.940    -.0382761    .0354673
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons      .765695   .4229092     1.81   0.070    -.0631918    1.594582
       lnl1s     .9297886   .0410462    22.65   0.000     .8493395    1.010238
         lnp    -.0073454    .005203    -1.41   0.158    -.0175431    .0028523
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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Table 33: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP, natural gas price, lagged gas price, coal price 
and lagged coal price 
 
 
 
Table 34: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP, natural gas price, lagged gas price, coal price 
and lagged coal price 
 
 
Table 35: Regression results, price is instrumented by GDP, lagged GDP, natural gas price, lagged gas price, coal price 
and lagged coal price 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .2473719   .6354241     0.39   0.697    -.9980365     1.49278
         lnr    -.0291452   .0271566    -1.07   0.283    -.0823711    .0240808
       lnl1s      .993098   .0712403    13.94   0.000     .8534695    1.132727
         lnp    -.0015449    .007513    -0.21   0.837    -.0162701    .0131804
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .7253181   .3992368     1.82   0.069    -.0571717    1.507808
         lnc    -.0088192   .0161163    -0.55   0.584    -.0404066    .0227682
       lnl1s     .9359758    .038522    24.30   0.000     .8604741    1.011477
         lnp    -.0091124   .0152462    -0.60   0.550    -.0389944    .0207696
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .2052247   .6603675     0.31   0.756    -1.089072    1.499521
         lnc    -.0137127   .0164939    -0.83   0.406    -.0460401    .0186147
         lnr     -.027813   .0282454    -0.98   0.325     -.083173    .0275469
       lnl1s     .9982305   .0737433    13.54   0.000     .8536964    1.142765
         lnp     .0011466   .0186498     0.06   0.951    -.0354064    .0376996
                                                                              
         lns        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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